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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are law professors (listed in Addendum A) who have taught, studied, 
written about, and have expertise in the Constitution, constitutional history, and the 
structure and requisites of American federalism.1  They take no position on the 
wisdom of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), a question on which their views diverge.  Nonetheless, they 
have a profound interest in and expertise on the legal issue this Court is called 
upon to decide—whether the Act is within Congress’s powers.  On that question 
they are of one mind:  The provision is plainly constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the minimum-coverage provision of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having experienced the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution’s Framers understood that the national government needed authority 
____________________________ 
1 Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 29(c)(5), amici certify that no counsel for any party authored 
this brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief, and that 
no person other than amici, its members, and its counsel made such a monetary 
contribution.  The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1316476      Filed: 07/05/2011      Page 12 of 48
  2
sufficient “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in 
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”  2 
Records of the Federal Convention 21 (Farrand ed., 1911).  To that end, the Con-
stitution granted the national government broad powers—most important here, the 
power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, 
cl. 3, and to enact laws “necessary and proper” to the effective exercise of that 
power, id. art. I, §8, cl. 18.   
The federal government has long addressed national economic problems that 
state legislation could not solve or, worse, would exacerbate.  As the Nation’s 
economy has become increasingly integrated, moreover, Congress’s exercise of its 
commerce power has naturally expanded as well.  Today, it is beyond argument 
that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate not merely trade between 
States but also commerce within States that collectively has sufficient interstate 
effects.   
Perhaps for that reason, plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the vast 
majority of the Act’s provisions.   Plaintiffs thus do not argue that Congress ex-
ceeded its powers by enacting provisions that: 
 Prohibit insurers from denying coverage of preexisting condi-
tions.  42 U.S.C §300gg-3(a). 
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 Ban insurers from discriminating or denying eligibility based 
on health status.  Id. §300gg-4(a). 
 Bar insurers from establishing “lifetime limits” or “unreason-
able annual limits” on benefits and claims.  Id. §300gg-
11(a)(1)-(2). 
 Prohibit rescission of insurance contracts.  Id. §300gg-12. 
 Require insurers to provide a simple coverage summary.  Id. 
§300gg-15(b). 
 Require insurers to pay for preventive care.  Id. §300gg-13. 
 Require insurers to cover dependents to age 26.  Id. §300gg-
14(a). 
Any challenge to those provisions would be futile:  The Supreme Court has 
squarely held that Congress’s commerce powers extend to insurance-market 
regulation.  See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 
539 (1944). 
Plaintiffs instead challenge the Act’s minimum-coverage requirement—the 
so-called “individual mandate.”  Under that provision, most Americans who 
otherwise lack health insurance must, in effect, pay for healthcare in advance by 
obtaining some minimal level of health coverage, as opposed to seeking to 
purchase healthcare on the spot market (or to obtain healthcare without paying for 
it) later.  See 26 U.S.C. §5000A.  The decisions of millions of Americans to 
purchase health insurance now, or instead take a wait-and-see approach, so 
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profoundly affect interstate healthcare and health-insurance markets that Con-
gress’s authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause should be beyond doubt.   
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, is independently supported 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  A central purpose of the Act is to regulate 
interstate commerce—to impose certain terms on health-insurance contracts sold 
across the country to make them more readily available.  No one disputes that such 
direct regulation of health-insurance markets is within Congress’s commerce 
power.  But many of those regulatory efforts would, absent the minimum-coverage 
requirement, be futile or counterproductive.  A system requiring insurers to cover 
preexisting conditions, for example, cannot endure if individuals do not have to 
maintain insurance when they are healthy:  Too many healthy individuals would 
wait to buy insurance until they become sick, assured that coverage cannot be 
denied.  Insurance markets would become dominated by high-cost, high-risk pur-
chasers, with fewer healthy insureds to offset the costs.  Premiums would sky-
rocket, and cost pressures would drive insurers from the market altogether.   
Congress therefore recognized that the minimum-coverage requirement is 
“essential” to key portions of its regulation of insurance markets.  42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(2)(I).  From McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Necessary and Proper 
Clause has consistently been interpreted to grant Congress broad authority to enact 
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legislation appropriate or beneficial to the exercise of its enumerated powers.  The 
minimum-coverage requirement satisfies even the narrowest interpretations of that 
clause.  It is the keystone that prevents much of the Act’s indisputably valid edifice 
of insurance regulation from collapsing. 
ARGUMENT 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act directly regulates commerce 
by regularizing health-insurance contracts and restricting terms like preexisting-
condition exclusions and discriminatory pricing.  Those regulations, unquestion-
ably within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, would be ineffective absent 
the minimum-coverage requirement.  The Necessary and Proper Clause exists to 
permit Congress to enact such provisions where it reasonably deems them neces-
sary and appropriate to effectuating its enumerated powers.  The minimum-
coverage requirement, moreover, is a permissible regulation of commerce in its 
own right. 
I. The Commerce Clause Was Designed and Has Been Understood To 
Empower Congress To Address Problems Requiring National Solutions 
Having learned firsthand the disastrous consequences of denying the 
national government authority to address issues of common interest, the founding 
generation drafted a Constitution that empowers Congress to legislate for the 
general interests of the Nation, where the individual States are incompetent to act, 
and where individual state legislation might disrupt national harmony.  Plaintiffs’ 
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position harkens not to the original understanding of the Constitution (or to the 
Supreme Court’s cases interpreting it), but to the discredited Articles of Confeder-
ation.     
A. The Commerce Clause Was Designed To Afford Congress Broad 
Power Over National Economic Problems  
The Articles of Confederation had left the new Nation adrift in a motley sea 
of competing and conflicting state laws, its central government unable to maintain 
order.  George Washington thus lamented, “I do not conceive we can exist long as 
a nation, without having lodged some where a power which will pervade the whole 
Union in as energetic a manner, as the authority of the State governments extends 
over the several States.”  Washington, Letters and Addresses 287 (Viles ed., 1909).  
James Madison observed that the Articles had failed because of “[w]ant of concert 
in matters where common interest requires it.”  1 Letters and Other Writings of 
James Madison 321 (1865).  Without a central government capable of establishing 
uniform commercial regulations, States enacted protectionist restrictions on 
“commercial intercourse with other States,” which in turn “beg[a]t retaliating 
regulations” not merely “expensive and vexatious in themselves” but also 
“destructive of the general harmony.”  Id. 
The absence of a uniform economic policy exacted a heavy toll.  As Alexan-
der Hamilton observed, often “it would be beneficial to all the States to encourage, 
or suppress[,] a particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to [any] to 
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attempt it without the concurrence of the rest.”  7 The Papers of Alexander Hamil-
ton 78 (Syrett ed., 1962).  The risk of non-cooperation meant “the experiment 
would probably be left untried” by any State “for fear of a want of that concur-
rence.”  Id.; see also Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 
1241, 1258-59 (1997).  That fear was well founded.  For example, when States 
“needed to enact legislation prohibiting British ships from entering American 
harbors” to give the Nation leverage in trade negotiations, Massachusetts passed a 
navigation act restricting foreign vessels’ use of its ports.  LeBoeuf, The Econom-
ics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San 
Diego L. Rev. 555, 595-96 (1994).  But “most states did nothing,” preferring to 
take for themselves the “significant amount of trade” Massachusetts’s law diverted 
from its shores.  Id.  Massachusetts consequently repealed its legislation.  Id.   
Based on those experiences, the Framers understood “the necessity of some 
general and permanent system, which should at once embrace all interests, and, by 
placing the states upon firm and united ground, enable them effectually to assert 
their commercial rights.”  4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 254 (Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of 
Charles Pinckney).  The Constitutional Convention resolved that Congress should 
have power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also 
in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
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the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”  2 
Farrand, supra, at 21; see also 1 id. at 21 (Resolution VI of Virginia Plan).  The 
Committee of Detail expanded that principle into a draft Constitution with 
enumerated powers, including most notably authority to “regulate Commerce . . .  
among the several States.”  U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.   
As James Wilson—a Committee of Detail member and later the first 
Supreme Court Justice—explained, the Convention delegates agreed that federal 
power reaches “whatever object of government extends in its operation or effects 
beyond the bounds of a particular state.”  2 Elliot, supra, at 399.  While that 
principle was “sound and satisfactory,” “its application to particular cases would 
be accompanied with much difficulty, because . . .  room must be allowed for great 
discretionary latitude of construction of the principle.”  Id.  “In order to lessen or 
remove th[at] difficulty,” Wilson explained, “an enumeration of particular 
instances[ ] in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been 
attempted with much industry and care.”  Id.  Thus, “the purpose of enumeration 
was not to displace the principle” that federal power reaches all matters with 
“operation or effects beyond the bounds of a particular state”; the purpose instead 
was “to enact it.”  Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2010). 
Scholars of all stripes thus agree that the commerce power must be “under-
stood in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the 
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Articles of Confederation.”  Cooter & Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A 
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 165 (2010); see Cala-
bresi & Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism, 
63 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2011) (“The most compelling argument in American history 
for empowering our national government has been the need to overcome collective 
action problems.”); Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making 
of the Constitution 178 (1996); Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce 
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554 
(1995); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1335 (1934). 
B. Longstanding Practice and Precedent Confirm Congress’s Broad 
Regulatory Authority Under the Commerce Clause 
Consistent with that history, the Supreme Court has long held that the 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to address national economic problems 
where action by the individual States is ineffective or deleterious, or where concer-
ted action is otherwise appropriate.  That power has proved “‘broad enough to 
allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1965, in view of the Nation’s increasingly interdependent economy.   
1. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Mar-
shall ruled that Congress can regulate steamboat navigation on the Hudson River.  
Establishing a broad principle that echoed the Constitutional Convention’s resolu-
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tions, he explained that the commerce power extends “to all the external concerns 
of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally,” 
excluding only those concerns “completely within a particular State,” and “which 
do not affect other States.”  Id. at 195. 
While Gibbons established federal authority over the “deep streams which 
penetrate our country in every direction,” 22 U.S. at 195, railways eventually over-
took rivers as the dominant means of interstate transportation.  But “the require-
ments of the various state statutes were conflicting and difficult for the railroads to 
implement.”  McDonald, 100 Years of Safer Railroads 1, 6-7 (1993).  “[S]tate 
governments as well as some segments of the railroad industry began to urge 
Federal legislation to provide a workable set of standards.”  Id. at 7.  When 
railroads balked at federal regulation of intrastate rates, the Supreme Court re-
buffed their challenges.  See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 350 (1914).  
Even if intrastate shipping was not by itself under Congress’s power, Congress 
“unquestionably” could “prevent the intrastate operations of [the railroads] from 
being made a means of injury to” its regulation of interstate commerce.  Id. at 351.  
In doing so, Congress was entitled to “take all measures necessary or appropriate 
to that end.”  Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
2. The Supreme Court’s path has not been unbroken.  It has at times 
barred Congress from addressing commercial problems the States could not handle 
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themselves.  In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court invalidated a federal 
prohibition on the interstate movement of goods produced by child labor even 
though state efforts to prohibit child labor were undermined by competition from 
States with laxer standards.  247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918); see also Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-10 (1936).  But the Court has since recognized that, in 
our increasingly interdependent national economy, those “Commerce Clause cases 
artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); see NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937).  For example, in United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court repudiated Hammer and held that Congress 
could regulate manufacturing to ensure that interstate commerce would not “be 
made the instrument of [unfair and disruptive] competition” among the States “in 
the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions.”  Id. at 115-
17; see Balkin, supra, at 32. 
Time and again the Court has upheld federal legislation on similar grounds.  
Sustaining federal unemployment-benefits legislation under Congress’s taxing 
power, for example, the Supreme Court noted the States’ unwillingness to enact 
similar legislation “lest in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place 
themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or 
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competitors.”  Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).2  
A State’s beneficent actions might also unduly drain its coffers, because “[t]he 
existence of . . . a system [of old-age benefits] is a bait to the needy and dependent 
elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.  Only a power 
that is national can serve the interests of all.”  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 
644 (1937). 
The Court similarly recognized the profound impact of intrastate matters on 
interstate commerce in upholding New Deal labor regulation, reaffirming Chief 
Justice Marshall’s observation that federal power extends “to those internal con-
cerns which affect the States generally” and excludes only matters “completely 
within a particular State” that “do not affect other States.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 
195.  “Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately con-
sidered,” the Court held, “if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to 
exercise that control.”  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.   
____________________________ 
2 The Court noted that Massachusetts’s unemployment-benefits act by its terms 
would “not become operative unless the federal bill became a law, or unless eleven 
of [21 listed] states should impose on their employers burdens substantially 
equivalent.”  Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 588 n.9. 
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Then-Solicitor General (later Justice) Stanley Reed thus explained how 
increasingly interconnected markets had led to expanded exercises of federal 
commerce power:  “In a simpler time, when life ordinarily was limited to com-
munity activities, or at most to the boundaries of a single State, the powers granted 
to the national government were rarely utilized in such manner as to affect the 
daily existence of the citizen.”  Reed, The Constitution and the Problems of Today, 
47 Proc. Va. St. Bar Ass’n 277, 277 (1936).  But “[w]ith our social and economic 
development, with improvements in transportation and communication, with 
broadening boundaries and increasing population, with industrialization and multi-
plying world contacts, problems believed to require further exercise of national 
powers appeared.”  Id.  Everyone, Reed concluded, “must recognize the desira-
bility of Federal and State legislation of a new type to meet the exigencies of this 
modern world.”  Id. at 300. 
That explanation echoed the understanding that had come to pervade the 
Nation.  See, e.g., Rendezvous with Destiny: Addresses and Opinions of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt 295 (Hardman ed., 1944) (“The prosperity of the farmer does 
have an effect today on the manufacturer in Pittsburgh.  The prosperity of the 
clothing worker in the City of New York has an effect on the prosperity of the 
farmer in Wisconsin, and so it goes.  We are interdependent—we are tied to-
gether.”).  The Supreme Court likewise came to recognize that, in an integrated 
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economy, even small choices—such as a farmer’s “trivial” consumption of 
homegrown wheat—can cumulatively have sufficient repercussions throughout 
national markets to justify federal regulation.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 
127-28 (1942); see Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 160 (state efforts to combat wheat 
overproduction “faced insuperable difficulties” because “holdout” States refused to 
restrict producers).  
3. Since then, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold Congress’s 
power to protect, promote, and regulate interstate commerce.  For example, Con-
gress may prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, because such 
discrimination restricts interstate travelers’ choices and impedes the free flow of 
commerce.  See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964).  And Congress 
may enact environmental measures that States, deterred by the prospect of 
disadvantaging in-state businesses, might not implement themselves.  See Hodel v. 
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981).  
The need for national solutions has also grown as the Nation has increased 
from 13 to 50 States.  Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 143; Balkin, supra, at 12 n.37.  
“[A]s the number of members of a federation increases, the amount of regulation 
of interstate commerce and the scope of the federal government’s power over 
interstate commerce . . . increase[s] as well.”  Calabresi & Terrell, supra, at 16.  
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The exercise of federal commerce power has thus expanded both with our inter-
connected economy and with the need for national solutions to problems that 
would otherwise be left unaddressed by individual States—a need the Framers well 
understood.   
Far from rejecting that understanding, recent Supreme Court decisions 
emphasizing the limits of Congress’s commerce powers embrace it.  In striking 
down a federal prohibition on gun possession near schools, and a federal law 
addressing violence against women, the Supreme Court has carefully explained 
that those provisions bore only the most “attenuated” connection to anything 
resembling commerce, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000), and 
implicated no barriers to effective individual state action, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Those decisions are thus fully consistent with the broad 
commerce power the Court has recognized for two centuries.  
II. The Act Falls Within the Historical Understanding of Congress’s 
Commerce Powers 
A. The Act Directly Regulates Interstate Commerce 
In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s regu-
lation of insurance, holding that “the word ‘commerce’ as used in the Commerce 
Clause . . . include[s] a business such as insurance.”  322 U.S. at 539; see 42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(3).  Health insurance is no exception.  To the contrary, its interstate 
nature is inescapable.  “Health insurance and health care services” now constitute 
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over one-sixth of the U.S. economy.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(B).  And “[p]rivate 
health insurance spending . . . pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that 
are shipped in interstate commerce.”  Id.  “[M]ost health insurance is sold by 
national or regional health insurance companies”; “health insurance is sold in inter-
state commerce”; and “claims payments flow through interstate commerce.”  Id.   
There is thus no serious debate that almost all the Act’s provisions address-
ing health-insurance contract terms fall squarely within Congress’s commerce 
power.  Those provisions do not merely address matters that “substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).  They directly 
regulate commercial transactions in a nationwide marketplace by regularizing the 
terms on which health insurance is offered.  Regulations governing the “practical 
aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business” affect the 
“[i]nterrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states 
in which they operate,” the “continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse 
among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy 
obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential 
to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts.”  South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S. at 541.  The Act permissibly “prescrib[es] rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190. 
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The Act also regulates in an area where the States often cannot.  Today, 
most States allow insurance companies to deny “coverage, charge higher premi-
ums, and/or refuse to cover” preexisting medical conditions.  Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Coverage Denied 1 (2009).  As a result, many individuals—
including those who most need healthcare—cannot obtain insurance.  Id.  Yet 
pioneering States seeking to compel coverage for preexisting conditions confront a 
grave risk of systemic failure.  Individuals whose health conditions make it 
impossible to obtain coverage in other States will be drawn to States with more 
protective laws.  That, in turn, can drive premiums up.  Healthier individuals may 
flee.  And insurers may abandon the State, leaving residents with fewer choices 
and less competition.  Indeed, after Kentucky enacted reform, all but two insurers 
(one State-run) abandoned the State.  See Kirk, Riding the Bull, 25 J. Health Pol. 
Pol’y & L. 133 (2000); Balkin, supra, at 46.  States seeking to resolve the problem 
of preexisting conditions thus face overwhelming difficulties if other States do not 
follow suit.  Only a handful of States have attempted to ban preexisting-condition 
exclusions, and only one, Massachusetts, has had anything approaching success.  
See p. 28, infra.   
The Act, moreover, prevents the “interrupt[ion]” of “the harmony of the 
United States” and impediments to interstate commerce that balkanized state 
regulation might cause.  2 Farrand, supra, at 21.  Individuals with preexisting 
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medical conditions, for example, cannot pursue new opportunities in States that 
permit insurers to deny them coverage.  Such unnecessary and nationally detri-
mental barriers to interstate migration and commerce are precisely what Congress 
has taken steps to redress in the past.  See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. I, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939; id. 
§195(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1991; cf. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53. 
B. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Falls Within Congress’s 
Commerce Power 
The minimum-coverage requirement regulates commerce.  As the United 
States has explained, Americans choose how to finance their healthcare:  They can 
pay for it in advance by purchasing insurance or risk trying to pay for it on an as-
needed basis.  Cumulatively, those individual choices have an impact on interstate 
commerce that dwarfs the decision to grow wheat for personal consumption at 
issue in Wickard.  In 2008, for example, the “cost of providing uncompensated 
care to the uninsured” totaled $43 billion.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(F).  “[H]ealth 
care providers pass on th[at] cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost” by 
charging families higher premiums, “by on average over $1,000 a year.”  Id.  Other 
effects abound:  Doctors “curtail unprofitable services and shorten hours of ser-
vice.”  Pagán & Pauly, Community-Level Uninsurance and the Unmet Medical 
Needs of Insured and Uninsured Adults, 41 Health Serv. Res. 788, 791 (2006).  
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And “lower revenue streams . . . could even force [providers and hospitals] to 
relocate or cease” operating altogether.  Id. at 789.  Thus, as with the other, 
unchallenged provisions of the Act, “Congress had a rational basis for concluding 
that leaving [healthcare-financing decisions by the uninsured] outside federal 
control would similarly affect price and market conditions.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that Congress does not have the power to regulate 
“non-activity, or inactivity.”  Pl. Br. 19.  That assertion has no pedigree in Supreme 
Court precedent, and harkens to formalisms long rejected by the Court.  As 
Wickard explained, “recognition of the relevance of the economic effects in the 
application of the Commerce Clause . . . has made the mechanical application of 
legal formulas no longer feasible.”  317 U.S. at 123-24.  Rather, “interstate com-
merce itself is a practical conception,” and so “interferences with that commerce 
must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience.”  Jones & 
Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41-42.  A regulated matter, “whatever its nature,” can 
“be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.  
The purported activity/inactivity distinction also makes little sense.  “Econo-
mists accept . . . that some forms of ‘inactivity’ affect economic health as much as 
activity does.”  Mariner & Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court, 363 
New Eng. J. Med. 1300, 1301 (2010).  The Supreme Court recognized that 
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principle in Wickard, holding that Congress could validly “restrict . . . the extent 
. . . to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing [wheat] to meet 
his own needs,” even if it “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they 
could provide for themselves.”  317 U.S. at 127, 129 (emphasis added).  “Far from 
being passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume” billions of dollars in 
uncompensated care, “the costs of which are passed through health care institutions 
to insured Americans.”  Rosenbaum & Gruber, Buying Health Care, the Individual 
Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 401, 402 (2010).   
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, falls on the “activity” side 
of any activity/inactivity divide.  There is virtually no such thing as “inactivity” in 
the healthcare market.  One cannot opt out of illness, disability, and death.  The 
requirement thus regulates present “economic and financial decisions about how 
and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased”—
whether to pay for healthcare now by buying insurance or to defer payment by 
attempting to self-insure.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  It like-
wise regulates the inevitable future activity of obtaining healthcare, by requiring 
advance arrangements that ensure an ability to pay for it.  Congress could certainly 
enact a statute requiring any individual who obtained healthcare without payment 
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in 2010 to purchase insurance for 2011 or pay a penalty.  The Act simply does that 
without waiting for an instance of non-payment.3  
Plaintiffs invoke the rhetoric of personal liberty.  Pl. Br. 34-35, 42-43.  But 
the question here is not whether “other provisions of the Constitution—such as the 
Due Process Clause”—would preclude the regulation; the question is the scope of 
Congress’s commerce power.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Structural aspects of 
the Constitution often protect individual liberty.  See Clinton v. City of New York, 
524 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  But the Court enforces 
those aspects by ensuring that Congress is acting within its enumerated powers, not 
by importing substantive due process concerns into its Commerce Clause analysis.  
Plaintiffs do not frame their arguments in terms of substantive due process, a 
highly dubious theory that would put healthcare reform beyond even state 
authority.4  Yet invalidating the provision would have the same practical effect, 
given most States’ inability to address the problem alone. 
____________________________ 
3 Congress already directly regulates countless activities that increase the risk of 
requiring healthcare, from car safety, 49 U.S.C. §30101 et seq., to food content, 21 
U.S.C. §301 et seq.  Congress would not be said to regulate “inactivity” if it 
required everyone who chooses to engage in those activities—e.g., driving a car or 
buying certain foods—to obtain insurance, even though that would cover virtually 
every American.  The minimum-coverage requirement achieves the same result 
through less convoluted means. 
4 The minimum-coverage requirement no more violates substantive due process 
than far more invasive regulations like compulsory vaccination laws.  See Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
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No one disputes that Congress could have chosen to tax all Americans and 
spend those dollars buying insurance for each American “in aid of the ‘general 
welfare.’”  Cf. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-42.  The minimum-coverage require-
ment surely is no more damaging to individual liberty.  To the contrary, it removes 
the government as purchaser and allows individuals, not bureaucrats, to choose 
their policies.  Even if a few individuals might have been able to self-insure 
reliably, or to live so remotely as to preclude any resort to the healthcare system, 
Congress is not required “to legislate with scientific exactitude.”  Raich, 545 U.S. 
at 17.  It may, “ ‘[w]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil[,] . . . make the 
law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented.’”  Perez v. United States, 
402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).  “When Congress decides that the ‘“total incidence”’ of 
a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).  When uninsured individuals seek 
healthcare, they in the aggregate impose an enormous burden on the healthcare 
system that “affect[s] price and market conditions” of health insurance generally.  
Id. at 19; 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(F); see pp. 18-20, supra.  As a result, “a ‘rational 
basis’ exists” for concluding that uninsured individuals “substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2011) 
(statement of Professor Charles Fried), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02% 
20Fried%20Testimony.pdf. 
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III. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Is Necessary and Proper To 
Effectuate Congress’s Regulation of Health Insurance 
The minimum-coverage requirement’s constitutionality is also indepen-
dently supported by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The Necessary and Proper 
Clause at the very least allows Congress to enact additional provisions that are 
essential to the effective exercise of its enumerated powers.  That is precisely what 
the minimum-coverage requirement does.  There is no dispute that Congress has 
authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit, for example, discriminatory 
pricing and preexisting-condition exclusions.  The minimum-coverage provision 
prevents the adverse selection that would otherwise cause those prohibitions to 
collapse.  If a provision needed to protect Congress’s exercise of Commerce 
Clause authority from self-destruction is not “necessary and proper,” it is hard to 
imagine what is. 
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Grants Congress Broad Powers 
To Choose Means That Are Rationally Related to the Implemen-
tation of Its Legitimately Exercised Powers 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution “grants Congress broad authority,” 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956, to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers, U.S. Const. art. I, §8, 
cl. 18.  Congress legitimately exercises that power “when the means chosen, 
although themselves not within the granted power, [a]re nevertheless deemed 
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appropriate aids” rationally related “to the accomplishment of some purpose within 
an admitted power of the national government.”  Darby, 312 U.S. at 121. 
Because the Necessary and Proper Clause “empowers Congress to enact 
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to 
enact in isolation,” necessary-and-proper legislation in aid of Congress’s com-
merce power need not itself “regulate economic activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 37, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  It is sufficient for the provision to be helpful to the regulation of such 
economic activities. 
That has been true for centuries.  In McCulloch, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that “a government, entrusted with” enumerated powers, “must also be 
entrusted with ample means for their execution.”  17 U.S. at 408.  “[N]ecessary,” 
Chief Justice Marshall explained, does not mean “absolutely necessary.”  Id. at 
414-15; see also 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
§1243, at 118 (1833); id. §1240, at 116.  “Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative 
authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).  The Necessary and Proper 
Clause sweeps broadly because the Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to 
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come, and, consequently [is] to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”  
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415; see id. at 421. 
McCulloch was not written on a blank slate.  Hamilton and Madison had 
sparred over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause as they debated the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States.  To Hamilton, the proper focus 
was on “the end to which the measure relates as a mean.”  Legislative and Docu-
mentary History of the Bank of the United States 99 (Clark & Hall eds., 1832).  “If 
the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the 
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular 
provision of the constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass 
of the national authority.”  Id.  Madison took a narrower view, interpreting the 
clause as endowing Congress with power only to provide a “direct and incidental 
means” to support the exercise of an enumerated power.  Id. at 42.  In the end, 
Hamilton prevailed:  “The interpretation given by Mr. Hamilton was substantially 
followed by Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch . . . .”  The Legal Tender Cases, 
79 U.S. 457, 642 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).  But the minimum-coverage 
provision survives even under Madison’s more limited interpretation. 
B. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Comfortably Falls Within 
Congress’s Necessary-and-Proper Authority 
To be valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute need only 
“constitute[ ] a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitu-
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tionally enumerated power.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  The Constitution 
entrusts the choice of means “ ‘primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress.’”  Id. at 
1957.  “ ‘If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the 
end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the 
closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, 
are matters for congressional determination alone.’”  Id. 
Here, the minimum-coverage requirement—which “must be viewed not as a 
stand-alone reform, but as one piece of a larger package of reforms meant to 
revamp the national health care market by creating new procedures and institutions 
to reduce overall costs,” JA 107—fits comfortably within the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.   
1. There is no dispute that Congress legitimately exercised its Commerce 
Clause authority when it enacted provisions preventing insurers from imposing 
preexisting-condition exclusions, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-3(a), or health-status restric-
tions, id. §300gg-4(a).  See p. 16, supra.  The minimum-coverage requirement is a 
necessary and proper means of ensuring that those provisions do not collapse under 
the weight of a massive adverse-selection problem. 
The prohibition on exclusions for preexisting conditions, for example, could 
encourage individuals not to buy insurance until they have a condition needing 
coverage.  “[I]f there were no requirement” that individuals maintain insurance, 
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Congress observed, “many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance 
until they needed care,” 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(I), and the requirement that 
insurers cover them even if they have preexisting conditions would encourage that 
course.  Insurance markets would become dominated by high-cost, high-risk 
individuals in need of immediate care.  Premiums would skyrocket, defeating the 
very objectives Congress sought to achieve—making insurance more widely and 
readily available to the American public.  Thus, without the minimum-coverage 
requirement, the Act’s “efforts to end discrimination in insurance on the basis of 
pre-existing conditions would be financially untenable.”  JA 147. 
Congress concluded that the appropriate means of preventing that adverse-
selection problem, and protecting the prohibitions on preexisting-condition ex-
clusions and similar requirements, was to require all qualified individuals (healthy 
and unhealthy alike) to participate.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(I).  The minimum-
coverage requirement, Congress thus found, is “essential to creating effective 
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be 
sold.”  Id.   
That “ ‘judgment of Congress,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957, is not merely 
entitled to judicial respect.  It is based on unassailable economics.  Absent a man-
date, adverse selection drives up premiums.  See Glied et al., Consider It Done? 
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The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 Health Aff. 1612, 1613 
(2007).  Indeed, “[f]ive states have tried to undertake reforms . . . without enacting 
an individual mandate; those five states are now among the eight states with the 
most expensive nongroup health insurance.”  Rosenbaum & Gruber, supra, at 403.  
In Washington and Kentucky, insurers fled the market.  Kirk, supra, at 139, 152.  
By contrast, when Massachusetts coupled its limit on preexisting-condition 
exclusions with an individual mandate, that substantially ameliorated the adverse-
selection problem.  Chandra, et al., The Importance of the Individual Mandate—
Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 293, 295 (2011).  To be 
necessary and proper, a provision need only “constitute[ ] a means that is rationally 
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Here, the minimum-coverage requirement is not merely 
“rationally related” to Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause authority.  It is 
critical to many of the Act’s provisions.   
2. Rather than addressing whether the minimum-coverage requirement is 
rationally related to Congress’s exercise of its commerce powers, plaintiffs argue 
that the requirement cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
because that provision should not allow Congress to legislate beyond an 
enumerated power.  Pl. Br. 47-48.  That view cannot be reconciled with the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the clause does allow Congress to “enact laws in 
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effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in 
isolation.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see Com-
stock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957-58; Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.  It is also contrary to 
centuries of precedent.  Under McCulloch, a provision need only be “convenient, 
or useful” or “conducive” to Congress’s exercise of an enumerated power, 17 U.S. 
at 413, 418, a standard the minimum-coverage requirement comfortably meets.  
Indeed, the requirement satisfies any conceivable interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  The requirement survives review whether one requires “a 
tangible link to commerce,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment), an “ ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred by the Constitu-
tion and the law enacted by Congress,” id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment), an “ ‘“obvious, simple, and direct relation”’ to an exercise of Congress’ 
enumerated powers,” id. at 1975 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting), or, as Madison 
thought, a “direct and incidental” connection to a constitutional end, Clark & Hall, 
supra, at 42.  Quite simply, the minimum-coverage requirement is directly nec-
essary to the efficacy of a comprehensive regulatory scheme otherwise within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.   
Indeed, while the Supreme Court has rejected the claim that “Necessary and 
Proper” legislation “can be no more than one step removed from a specifically 
enumerated power,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
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1965-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), the minimum-coverage require-
ment would meet even that test.  It is only one step removed because, without it, 
many of the Act’s direct regulations of insurance terms in interstate commerce 
would crater.  See pp. 26-28, supra.  While courts should not “‘pile inference upon 
inference’” to sustain congressional action under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment), no inference-piling is needed here.  Experience has shown that the 
non-discrimination requirements and the prohibition against preexisting-condition 
exclusions—both proper exercises of core Commerce Clause powers—could not 
function effectively absent the minimum-coverage requirement.  In short, it is not 
“merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on which Congress might 
have perceived an attenuated link between the powers underlying the [Act’s health-
insurance regulations] and the challenged [minimum-coverage] provision.”  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).  The “substantial 
link to Congress’ constitutional powers” is readily apparent.  Id. 
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause also obviates any activity/inactivity 
distinction.  “[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate 
commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).  There 
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is no room in that standard for distinctions between compelling and prohibiting 
conduct.   
History makes clear, moreover, that “individual mandates” are accepted, 
“necessary and proper” means of effectuating enumerated powers.  In the Repub-
lic’s earliest days, Congress discharged its authority to “provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 16, by compelling 
activity:  It mandated militiamen to obtain particular arms and supplies.  See, e.g., 
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, §1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (persons liable for service must 
provide “a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints,” 
and ammunition); id. §4, 1 Stat. at 272-73 (horses and uniforms).  Congress has 
also prohibited inactivity by requiring people to respond to the census, 13 U.S.C. 
§221(a)-(b), report for jury duty, 28 U.S.C. §1866(g), and register for selective 
service, 50 App. U.S.C. §453—yet those measures are not expressly mentioned in 
the Constitution.  Congress thus has a long history of compelling conduct in 
service of other enumerated powers.  The Commerce Clause—one of Congress’s 
broadest powers—should not be viewed any differently.   
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s judgment should be affirmed. 
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